In this paper, we propose to use a wireless-powered friendly jammer to enable secure communication between a source node and destination node, in the presence of an eavesdropper. We consider a twophase communication protocol with fixed-rate transmission. In the first phase, wireless power transfer is conducted from the source to the jammer. In the second phase, the source transmits the informationbearing signal under the protection of a jamming signal sent by the jammer using the harvested energy in the first phase. We analytically characterize the long-time behavior of the proposed protocol and derive a closed-form expression for the throughput. We further optimize the rate parameters for maximizing the throughput subject to a secrecy outage probability constraint. Our analytical results show that the throughput performance differs significantly between the single-antenna jammer case and the multiantenna jammer case. For instance, as the source transmit power increases, the throughput quickly reaches an upper bound with single-antenna jammer, while the throughput grows unbounded with multiantenna jammer. Our numerical results also validate the derived analytical results.
design where power transfer and information transmission are separated in time, similar to some non-secrecy point-to-point systems that used time-switching protocols [22] , [25] , [33] .
The main contributions of this work are summarized below:
• We propose a communication protocol that provides secure communication using an energyconstrained jamming node wirelessly powered by the source node. The protocol sets a target jamming power and switches between IT and PT depending on whether the available energy at the jammer meets the target power or not.
• We study the long-time behavior of the proposed communication protocol and derive a closed-form expression of the probability of IT. Based on this, we obtain the achievable throughput of the protocol with fixed-rate transmission.
• We optimize the rate parameters to achieve the maximum throughput while satisfying a constraint on the secrecy outage probability. Further design insights are obtained by considering the high SNR regime and the large number of antennas regime. We show that when the jammer has a single antenna, increasing the source transmit power quickly makes the throughput converge to an upper bound. However, when the jammer has multiple antennas, increasing the source transmit power or the number of jammer antennas improves the throughput significantly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model. Section III proposes the secure communication protocol. Section IV analyzes the protocol and derives the achievable throughput. Section V formulates an optimization problem for secrecy performance, and gives the optimal design. Section VI presents numerical results. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication scenario where a source node (S) communicates with a destination node (D) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (E) with the help of a friendly jammer (J), as illustrated in Fig. 1 . We assume that the jammer has N J antennas (N J ≥ 1), while all the other nodes are equipped with a single antenna only.
A. Jammer Model
In this work, the jammer is assumed to be an energy constrained node with no power of its own and having a rechargeable battery with infinite capacity [24] , [33] , [34] . In order to make use of the jammer, the source node wirelessly charges the jammer via wireless power transfer.
Once the jammer harvests sufficient energy, it can be used for transmitting friendly jamming signals to enhance the security of the communication between the source and the destination. We assume that the jammer's energy consumption is dominated by the jamming signal transmission, while the other energy consumption, e.g., due to the signal processing, is relatively insignificant and hence ignored for simplicity [23] , [26] .
B. Channel Assumptions
We assume that all the channel links are composed of large-scale path loss with exponent m and statistically independent small-scale Rayleigh fading. We denote the inter-node distance respectively. The fading channel gains of the links S → J, S → D, S → E, J → E and
respectively. These fading channel gains are modeled as quasi-static frequency non-selective parameters, which means that they are constant over the block time of T seconds and independent and identically distributed between blocks.
Consequently, each element of these complex fading channel coefficients are circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. In this paper, we make the following assumptions on channel state information (CSI) and noise power:
• The CSI (h SD and h JD ) is assumed to be perfectly available at both the transmitter and receiver sides. This allows benchmark system performance to be determined.
• The CSI of the eavesdropper is only known to itself.
• Noise power at the eavesdropper is zero in line with [35] , which corresponds to the worst case scenario.
C. Transmission Phases
The secure communication with wireless-powered jammer takes places in two phases: (i) power transfer (PT) phase and (ii) information transmission (IT) phase, as shown in Fig. 1 . During the PT phase, the source transfers power to the jammer by sending a radio signal with power P s .
The jammer receives the radio signal, converts it to a direct current signal and stores the energy in its battery. During the IT phase, the jammer sends jamming signal to the eavesdropper with power P J by using the stored energy in the battery. At the same time, the source transmits the information signal to the destination with power P s under the protection of the jamming signal.
We define the information transmission probability as the probability of the communication process being in the IT phase and denote it by p tx .
D. Secure Encoding and Performance Metrics
We consider confidential transmission between the source and the destination, using Wyner's wiretap code [36] . Specifically, there are two rate parameters of the wiretap code, namely the rate of codeword transmission, denoted by R t , and the rate of secret information, denoted by R s . The positive rate difference R t − R s is the cost to provide secrecy against the eavesdropper.
A M-length wiretap code is constructed by generating 2 M Rt codewords x M (w, v) of the length M, where w = 1, 2, ..., 2 M Rs and v = 1, 2, ..., 2 M (Rt−Rs) . For each message index w, the value of v is selected randomly with uniform probability from 1, 2, ..., 2 M (Rt−Rs) , and the constructed codeword to be transmitted is x M (w, v). Clearly, reliable transmission from the source to the destination cannot be achieved when R t > C d , where C d denotes the channel capacity of S → D
link. This event is defined as connection outage event. From [36] , perfect secrecy cannot be achieved when R t − R s < C e , where C e denotes the fading channel capacity of S → E link.
This event is defined as secrecy outage event. In this work, we consider fixed rate transmission, which means R t and R s are fixed and chosen off-line following [37] , [38] .
Since we consider quasi-static fading channel, we use outage based measures as considered in [37] , [39] . Specifically, the connection outage probability and secrecy outage probability are defined, respectively, as
where P {ν} denotes the probability for success of event ν. Note that the connection outage probability is a measure of the fading channel quality of the S → D link. Since the current CSI is available at the legitimate nodes, the source can always suspend transmission when connection outage occurs. This is easy to realize by one-bit feedback from the destination. Therefore, in this work, connection outage leads to suspension of IT but not decoding error at the destination.
Our figure of merit is the throughput, π, which is the average number of bits of confidential information received at the destination per unit time [37] , [39] , and is given by
As we will see in Sec. IV, the information transmission probability p tx contains the connection outage probability p co .
It is important to note that a trade-off exists between throughput achieved at the destination and secrecy against the eavesdropper (measured by the secrecy outage probability). For example, increasing R s would increase π in (3), but also increase p so in (2) . This trade-off will be investigated later in Section V in this paper.
III. PROPOSED SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a simple fixed-power and fixed-rate secure communication protocol, which employs a wireless-powered jammer. Note that more sophisticated power and rate adaptation strategies at the source are possible but outside the scope of this paper.
A. Transmission Protocol
We consider the communication in blocks of T seconds, each block being either a PT or an IT block. Intuitively, IT should happen when the jammer has sufficient energy for jamming and the S → D link is in a good condition to ensure successful information reception at the destination.
We define the two conditions for a block to be used for IT as follows:
• At the beginning of the block, the jammer has enough energy, P J T , to support jamming with power P J over an information transmission block of T seconds, and
• the link S → D does not suffer connection outage, which means it can support the codeword transmission rate R t from the source to the destination.
Note that both conditions are checked at the start of each block and must be satisfied simultaneously for the block to be an IT block. If the first condition is not satisfied, then the block is used for PT and we refer to it as a dedicated PT block. If the first condition is satisfied while the second condition is not, then the block is still used for PT but we refer it as an opportunistic PT block. Note that P J is a design parameter in the proposed protocol.
For an accurate description of the transmission process, we define a PT-IT cycle as a sequence 
B. Long-Time Behavior
We are interested in the long-time behavior (rather than that during the transition stage) of the communication process determined by our proposed protocol. After a sufficiently long time, the behavior of the communication process falls in one of the following two cases:
• Energy Accumulation: In this case, on average, the energy harvested at the jammer during opportunistic PT blocks is higher than the energy required during an IT block. Thus, after a long time has passed, the energy steadily accumulates at the jammer and there is no need for dedicated PT blocks (the harvested energy by opportunistic PT blocks fully meet the energy consumption requirement at the jammer). Consequently, only PT-IT cycles with X = 0 can occur.
• Energy Balanced: In this case, on average, the energy harvested at the jammer during opportunistic PT blocks is lower than the energy required during an IT block. Thus, after a long time has passed, dedicated PT blocks are sometimes required to make sure that the energy harvested from both dedicated and opportunistic PT blocks equals the energy required for jamming in IT blocks on average. Consequently, all four types of PT-IT cycles can occur.
In the next section, the mathematical model for the proposed protocol is presented. The boundary condition between the energy accumulation and energy balanced cases is derived.
In Section VI, we will also verify the long-time behavior through simulations.
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the proposed secure communication protocol and derive the achievable throughput for the proposed secure communication protocol.
A. Signal Model
In a PT block, the source sends radio signal x SJ with power P s . Thus, received signal at the jammer, y J is given by
where x SJ is the normalized signal from the source in an PT block, and n J is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the jammer. Using (4), the average harvested energy in one PT block, ρ J is given by
During an IT block, the source transmits information-carrying signal with the protection from the jammer. The jammer applies different signaling methods depending on its number of antennas.
When N J = 1, the jammer sends a noise-like signal x JD with power P J , affecting both the destination and the eavesdropper. When N J > 1, by using the artificial interference generation method in [35] , the jammer generates an N J ×(N J − 1) matrix W which is an orthonormal basis of the null space of h JD , and also an vector v with N J − 1 independent identically distributed complex Gaussian random elements with normalized variance. Then the jammer sends W v as jamming signal. Thus, the received signal at the destination, y D , is given by
where x SD is the normalized information signal from the source in an IT block and n d is the AWGN at the destination with variance σ 2 d . Similarly, the received signal at the eavesdropper, y E , is given by
where n e is the AWGN at the eavesdropper which we have assumed to be 0 as a worst-case scenario.
From (6), SINR at the destination is
Hence the capacity of S → D link is given as
Since |h SD | and |h JD | are Rayleigh distributed, |h SD | 2 and |h JD | 2 are exponential distributed and γ d has the cumulative distribution function (cdf) as
where,
For convenience, we define the SNR at the destination (without jamming noise) as
From (7), the SINR at the eavesdropper is
Hence, the capacity of S → E link is given as C e = log 2 (1 + γ e ). Using the fact that h SE , h JE and the entries of h JE W are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian variables, from [39] , γ e has the probability density function (pdf) as
Using the pdf of γ e in (14) , the secrecy outage probability defined in (2) can be evaluated.
B. Information Transmission Probability
Focusing on the long-time behavior, we analyze the proposed secure communication protocol and derive the information transmission probability p tx , which in turn gives the throughput in (3) . Note that p tx is the probability of an arbitrary block being used for IT. As discussed in the last section, the communication process falls in either energy accumulation or energy balanced case. Thus p tx will have different values for the two different cases. First we mathematically characterize the condition of being in either case in the lemma below.
Lemma 1. The communication process with the proposed secure communication protocol leads to energy accumulation if
is satisfied. Otherwise, the communication process is energy balanced.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Using Lemma 1, we can find the general expression for p tx as presented in Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1. The information transmission probability for the proposed secure communication protocol is given by
where
Proof: We first model the communication process in both energy accumulation and energy balanced cases as Markov chains and show the ergodicity of the process. This then allows us to derive the stationary probability of a block being used for IT either directly or by using time averaging. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix B.
By substituting (16) in (3), we obtain the achievable throughput of the proposed protocol.
V. OPTIMAL DESIGN FOR THROUGHPUT
In the last section, we derived the achievable throughput with given design parameters.
Specifically the jamming power P J is a design parameter of the protocol. A different value of P J results in a different impact on the eavesdropper's SINR, hence leads to different secrecy outage probability defined in (2) . Also the rate parameters of the wiretap code, R t and R s , affect the secrecy outage probability. Hence, it is interesting to see how one can optimally design these parameters to maximize the throughput while keeping the secrecy outage probability below a prescribed threshold. In this section, we present such an optimal fixed-rate design of the proposed secure communication protocol.
A. Problem Formulation
We consider the optimal secure communication design as follows:
where ε is the secrecy outage probability constraint. This design aims to maximize the throughput with the constraint on the secrecy outage probability.
From (2), the secrecy outage probability should meet the requirement that
By substituting (14) into (19), we have
where φ is defined in (13) . Thus, from (20) , the jamming power P J should satisfy the condition
, e
Note that the terms (a) and (b) in (23) are the terms For analytical convenience, we define three 2-dimension rate regions:
where rate regionD denotes the boundary between regions D 1 and D 2 . From the discussion above, if (R t , R s ) ∈ D 1 , the communication process leads to energy accumulation, while if (R t , R s ) ∈ D 2 ∪D, it is energy balanced.
and R
⋆ t is given by R
Proposition 1 can then be used to obtain the optimal values of R t and R s as follows. We firstly assume the optimal results are in the region D 1 , thus R s and R t can be obtained by equation (28) and (29) . Then, we check whether the results are really in D 1 . If they are, we have obtained the optimal results. If not, we solve equation (31) to obtain the optimal R t and R s .
1) High SNR Regime:
We want know whether we can largely improve throughput by increasing the transmit power at the source, P s , thus we consider the high SNR regime. Note that we have defined SNR at the destination (without the effect of jamming noise) as ρ d in (11).
Corollary 1.1. When N J = 1 and the SNR at the destination is sufficiently high, the asymptotically optimal rate parameters and an upper bound of throughput are given bỹ
and W 0 (·) is the principle branch of the Lambert W function [40] .
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remarks:
i) The upper bound of throughput implies that one cannot effectively improve the throughput by further increasing P s when the SNR at the destination is already high.
ii) It can be checked that when P s is sufficiently high, the optimized communication process ,
where z ⋆ is calculated as the unique solution of
and
Proof: See Appendix E.
We can see that the left side of (39) is a monotonic decreasing function of z. Thus z can be easily obtained by using numerical methods.
1) High SNR Regime:
Similar to the single-antenna jammer case, we are interested in whether increasing the source transmission power P s , is an effective way of improving throughput. Hence the high SNR regime is considered:
Corollary 2.1. When N J > 1 and the SNR at the destination is sufficiently high, the asymptotically optimal rate parameters and an upper bound of throughput are given bỹ
and M is defined in (40) .
Proof: See Appendix F.
Remarks:
i) The throughput will always increase with increasing transmit power P s (because ρ d increases as P s increases). This is in contrast to the single-antenna jammer case, because the multiantenna jamming method only interferes the S → E link.
ii) From Proposition 2 and Corollary 2.1, when P s is sufficiently large, the optimized communication process is still energy balanced, which is different from the single-antenna jammer scenario. Intuitively, storing extra energy is not a good choice, because we can always use the accumulated energy to jam at the eavesdropper without affecting the destination, which in turn improves the throughput.
2) Large N J Regime: We also want to know that whether we can largely improve the throughput by increasing the number of antennas at the jammer.
Corollary 2.2. In large N J scenario, the asymptotically optimal rate parameters and an upper bound of throughput are given byR
where M is defined in (40) .
Proof: See Appendix G.
Remark: Corollary 2.2 gives an asymptotic upper bound on throughput for this protocol, thus, π does not increase towards infinity with N J . Intuitively, the throughput cannot always increase with N J , because it is bounded by the S → D channel capacity which is independent with N J .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to demonstrate the performance of the proposed secure communication protocol. We set the path loss exponent as m = 3, the energy conversion We can see that when R t = 26.9 bpcu, the available energy goes up and down, but does not have the trend of energy accumulation. Thus, the communication process is energy balanced. When R t = 26.95 and 27 bpcu, the available energy grows up, and the communication process leads to energy accumulation. Therefore, the condition given in Lemma 1 is verified. Fig. 4 plots the throughput in (23) with different R t and R s in the single-antenna jammer scenario. In Fig. 4 (a), we set P s = 0 dBm. The optimal rate parameters (R regarding the optimal operating point when the SNR at the destination is sufficiently large.
A. Energy Accumulation and Energy Balanced Cases

B. Rate Regions with Single-Antenna Jammer
C. Throughput Performance with Single-Antenna Jammer
Fig. 5 plots the throughput with optimal designs given by Proposition 1. We also include the suboptimal performance which is achieved by using the asymptotically optimal rate parameters in Corollary 1.1, as well as the upper bound on throughput in Corollary 1.1.
We can see that when P s = 5 dBm, the optimal throughput almost reaches the upper bound.
Also we can see that when P s < 20 dBm, the suboptimal performance has a large gap with the optimal one, while when P s > 20 dBm, the suboptimal performance is very close to the optimal one. In Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) , we set P s = 0 dBm and 30 dBm, respectively. The optimal rate parameters (R ⋆ t , R ⋆ s ) are both obtained in the regionD. This implies that the optimized communication process is energy balanced, which agrees with the remarks after Corollary 2.1. Fig. 7(a) plots the optimal throughput from Proposition 2. We also present the suboptimal performance which is achieved by the asymptotically optimal rate parameters obtained in Corollary 2.1. We can see that the throughput increases with P s unbounded. Also we can see that the suboptimal performance is reasonably good when P s > 20 dBm. Fig. 7(b) plots the throughput achieved with the optimal design given in Proposition 2 for different N J . The source transmit power is P s = 30 dBm. We also include the suboptimal performance achieved by the asymptotically optimal rate parameters in the large N J regime (Corollary 2.2) as well as the upper bound on throughput in Corollary 2.2.
D. Rate Regions with Multiple-Antenna Jammer
E. Throughput Performance with Multiple-Antenna Jammer
We can see that with the increment of N J , although theoretically the throughput is upper bounded as N J → ∞, the available throughput within practical range of N J is far from the upper bound. Hence, increasing N J is still an efficient way to improve the throughput with practical antenna size. Also we can see that the suboptimal performance is acceptable but the gap from the optimal throughput performance is still noticeable.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated secure communication with the help from a wireless-powered jammer. We proposed a simple communication protocol and derived its achievable throughput with fixed-rate transmission. We further optimized the rate parameters to achieve the best throughput subject to a secrecy outage probability constraints. As energy harvesting and wireless power transfer become emerging solutions for energy constrained networks, this work has demonstrated how to make use of an energy constrained friendly jammer to enable secure communication without relying on an external energy supply. For future work, the protocol can be extended to include adaptive transmit power. For example, in a PT block, the source can suspend power transfer if the channel between the source and the jammer is poor quality. In addition, more sophisticated adaptive rate transmission schemes can be designed. We will explore these relevant problems in our further work. In one PT-IT cycle, once the available energy is higher than P J T , there will be Y opportunistic PT blocks. The probability of the discrete random variable Y being k is the probability that the successive k blocks, suffer from connection outage of the S → D link, and the (k + 1)th block does not have the S → D outage. Due to the i.i.d. channel gains in different blocks, Y follows a geometric distribution and the probability mass function (pmf) is given by
The mean value of Y is given by
As we have defined ρ J as the average harvested energy by one PT block, the average harvested energy by Y opportunistic PT blocks in one PT-IT cycle is given by
If the average harvested energy by opportunistic PT blocks in a PT-IT cycle is higher than the required energy, P J T , for jamming in one IT block, the communication process leads to energy accumulation. Otherwise, we need dedicated PT blocks in some PT-IT cycles, and the communication process is energy balanced. Thus we have the condition in Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We derive information transmission probability p tx in the following two cases. It is easy to show that this Harris chain is recurrent and aperiodic, because any current energy state can be revisited in some future block, and one cannot find any two energy states that the transition from one to the other is periodic. Therefore, the Harris chain is ergodic [41] , and there exists a unique stationary measure (stationary distribution), which means that the stationary distribution of available energy at the beginning/end of each block exists. Thus the stationary probability of a block being used for IT (p tx ) or PT exists.
Energy Accumulation
Instead of deriving the stationary distribution of energy states, we use time averaging which makes use of the ergodic property, to calculate the information transmission probability p tx which is given by 2) where N IT and N P T denotes the number of IT and PT blocks in the communication process, N total N P T + N IT . By using the principle of conservation of energy (i.e., all the harvested energy in PT blocks are used for jamming in IT blocks) and the law of large numbers, we have
where ρ J is the average harvested energy in one PT block defined in (5) and P J T is the energy used for jamming in one IT block. By taking (B.3) into (B.2) the information transmission probability is given by
General Expression: Based on Lemma 1, (B.1) and (B.4), we can easily obtain the general expression for p tx as
(B.5)
From (1), we have,
By taking (9) into (B.6), we obtain the expression of p co in (17) . Since ς only appears in the denominator of (C.1), by taking the partial derivative of (C. Since the denominator of the middle term of (C.7) is greater than zero, (C.7) reduces to
where k 2 is defined in (35) .
Taking (C.6) into (C.8), optimal R s , R ⋆ s can be obtained easily by linear search, since the left side of (C.8) is monotonically increasing with R s which can be easily proved. The optimal R t can be calculated as (C.10)
Because π in (C.10) increases with R t , optimal R t and R s should be found at the boundary of Thus, from (C.12) we have R s = R t − log 2 (1 + ζ) .
(C.14)
By taking (C.14) into (C.10), we have π = R t − log 2 (1 + ζ) 1 + Thus, R
